In this essay I want to put forward less a single argument and more a series of theses and accompanying questions about the new in relation to art and subjectivity. And I want to do all this through recourse to two of Deleuze’s precursors (Bergson and Spinoza) and two of his fellow travellers (Foucault and Guattari). The essay ends with two case studies.

Theses on the new

Thesis 1: The new does not arrive from some ‘other place’ (transcendence), but is produced from the very matter of the world, after all what else is there? And where else can the new come from? The new then involves a recombination of already existing elements in and of the world (a new dice throw as Deleuze might say). The new would then be a repetition, but with difference. As such the new must be distinguished from fashion, which involves a repetition of the same, that is, does not really involve a radical recombination of elements. However, the new is not opposed to fashion, but rather accelerates certain of its operating logics, namely the production of difference. After all, there must be a certain amount of difference for fashion to be what it is. Fashion in this sense is the near enemy of art.

Here is my first question: is it enough to affirm a recombination of matter in order to produce something new? For example, a new art (or indeed a new subjectivity)? Would this not merely involve playing with that which is already here, already has reality as it were? Or, following Deleuze, would not such a recombination involve playing with that which is ‘possible’, the latter being a mirror-image or isotope of the real, in fact being the same, conceptually speaking, only lacking reality. Or to phrase this question in a slightly different manner: is there really such a difference between the new in art and the new in fashion? And if there is such a difference, as I think there is, then what else is needed to produce the new?
Thesis 2: A certain depth, or move beyond the horizontal plane of matter (the ‘what-is’). Put simply, the new involves accessing something ‘outside’ the present plane of existence. This is a slippery area as it involves a return to the terrain, we might call it the aesthetic, that was evacuated and critiqued within Marxism (ideology) and deconstruction (presence). That is to say my thesis so far affirms something that is not immediately accessible or apparent to the human configuration in its usual, or typical state.

My second question leads on from this: what is the nature of this ‘deeper’ realm from which something new emerges? And how can we access it as it were? I want now to track through the articulation of this terrain – this topology of sorts – in its specifically immanent formation.

Bergsonism

For Bergson, in *Matter and Memory*, this other place is precisely on a temporal axis, that is to say, is not another place as such, but rather another time (1991: 133–77). In fact, a kind of time that is radically different to the world of matter. Bergson calls it the pure-past, a virtual realm of pure potentiality. Such potential, Bergson argues, can only be actualized when a gap is opened between stimulus and response, that is to say, a break in habit (a break in the sensory-motor mechanism (with its attendant clichés of action and thought)). The human brain-body configuration produces this gap (the complexity of the nervous system, which allows for a multiplicity of different pathways for stimulus-response, determines a hesitation in that response), but the latter can be further opened through a general slowing down of the brain-body configuration, or simply a halt (the opening of ‘vacuoles of non-communication’ as Deleuze calls them) (1995: 175). Freedom from the present plane of existence, or merely the horizontal plane of matter, involves then an opening up to a certain verticality. This is the celebrated ‘cone’ of Bergson that Deleuze also attends to in *Bergsonism* (Deleuze, 1988: 59–61; Bergson, 1991: 150–54).

So, the new, here, is *not* about a simple recombination of matter, but involves a turning away from matter to a different realm (a realm that is different in kind) and a drawing on this source before returning to the world and allowing the journey to affect that world. In passing, we can note a quick caveat to this point: a recombination of matter might allow for this temporal flight. In fact, this must be the case on some level, that is, the putting in place of the material conditions that allow for a slowing down.

The new might be rephrased here as freedom, freedom from habit and from the present plane of purely utilitarian interests. Elsewhere Bergson remarks that this is the operating terrain of the mystic (he or she who orientates him/herself against ‘organised religion’ and the fixed rituals of society) (1935: 209–65). Deleuze also attends to this state in which there is ‘superabundant activity,
The Care of the Self

action, creation’ (1988: 112). In each case – that of an individual and that of a society – what is involved is an ‘escape’ from the fixed habits and impasses of the present through recourse to a ‘time’ undetermined by that present, a pure past which also, paradoxically, contains the possibility of determining a different future.

Spinozism

From Bergson’s topology of the actual/virtual to Spinoza’s topology of the three kinds of knowledge. And to begin with some very brief revision of the Ethics.¹ The first kind of knowledge names our general condition of being in the world. We are constituted by the more or less random affects that are determined by the more or less random encounters of our life. Indeed, our bodies and minds are, in one sense, a history of these encounters. The second kind of knowledge arises from the effort we make to understand and then organize these encounters. With the second kind of knowledge we seek to understand that which determines us, and thus why it is that we act in the way we do. We start consciously arranging our life, reflecting on what makes a ‘good’ encounter and thus what increases our capacity to act in the world (with the ultimate aim of not being subject to our passions, but, as Lacan might say, of becoming a cause of ourselves).

An ethical life thus involves an awareness/understanding, and the conscious recombination, of the elements of life – one’s encounters – in order to increase joy. In passing it is worth noting that advanced capitalism also organizes encounters so as to produce specifically sad affects, or paralysis, as well as promoting a certain ignorance as regards what causes certain affects (for example the overwhelming fear-anxiety affect of mass media ‘news’ programmes and the obsessive advertising of commodities to make us ‘feel better’). I will be returning to the relationship with capitalism in a moment. What we have with Spinoza is then a call to experiment following from a general ethology (a theory of bodies as composed of relations of speed/slowness and capacities to affect and be affected). Put simply, we are offered a physics with which to think life.

To return to my thesis on the new, we might say that the production of joyful encounters through experimentation and through the production of ‘common notions’ attendant on the latter (that is the second kind of knowledge), involves a break with habit and a concomitant new mode of being. Indeed, it is this that characterizes Deleuze’s interest in Spinoza’s Ethics; the latter is a blueprint for a genuinely creative life that is actively produced through an understanding of the causes of one’s experience. It is in this sense that the production of a new mode of being invariably involves following a programme of sorts.

According to Spinoza, this understanding of causality ultimately involves a leap from the second to a third kind of knowledge and the ‘arrival’ in a place
where everything agrees with oneself, which is to say, produces joy. The entire world affirms one’s being/capacity to act (one becomes, as it were, the world, or, put differently, one becomes the cause of oneself). In a sense the second kind of knowledge, the understanding of causes, operates as a launch platform for this other superhuman state. This place is different in kind from that which characterizes the first and second. Indeed, this place is not to do with ‘knowledge’ as such, or with the history of a specific body-mind (although it is the latter that allows for this journey, or leap). It is a place in which one experiences the eternal, which we might also characterize as Bergson’s pure-past.² It may appear that this ‘incredible speed’ of Book Five of the Ethics—a certain ‘speed of thought’—is fundamentally different from Bergson’s stillness, but in fact both are forms of speed, albeit not necessarily forms of movement. As Deleuze and Guattari point out in the plateau on the War Machine in A Thousand Plateaus, there are ‘spiritual voyages’ that are ‘effected without relative movement, but in intensity, in one place’ (1988: 381). Here, absolute immobility is itself part of the speed vector.

The ‘care of the self’

This question of a kind of knowledge, which is in fact not knowledge in the typical sense, is addressed in some detail in the late writings and lectures of Foucault.³ Indeed, for Foucault, there is a form of knowing, what Foucault calls truth, that breaks with the subject as he or she is typically produced. This truth, which cannot be communicated as it were, and which is primarily a concern of the self, necessarily involves a transformation of given subjectivity.

Briefly, in this late work Foucault outlines what he calls the founding Cartesian moment in the sciences and humanities, where the subject as constituted becomes the basis for the verification of ‘facts’ about the world. Here ‘truth’ is tied to proof and ‘knowledge’ becomes merely a question of evidence already apparent to the subject. In this place the new—as it is figured in science, or indeed, the humanities—is really just more of the same (more ‘knowledge’ as it were). Certainly in the Academy knowledge is increasingly figured as a kind of possession in this sense and subjectivity is seen as merely a vessel of sorts that wants ‘filling up’. It might well be argued that this has been the case since Descartes, but certainly in what might be called the informationization of society this understanding of the role of the Academy is increasingly dominant.⁴ Such knowledge tends not to challenge a given subject but rather to reassure him or her of his or her identity as is.⁵

Foucault compares this understanding of knowledge/truth with another tradition—that of the ‘care of the self’—where a certain kind of production of subjectivity is the cause and the effect of truth, the latter understood here in a more experiential way. That is to say then, there is a kind of knowledge or
understanding, what Foucault calls truth, that is intimately tied to the state of the subject and to what he or she can become (Alain Badiou, of course, follows a very similar line of argument). Here, the new, in terms of a new subjectivity, a new way of being in the world, cannot simply be read about, or directly accessed (deconstruction here just demonstrates the obvious), but is produced through a certain orientation/intention and through certain specific technologies, or what we might call an ethico-aesthetic programme. Foucault makes the point that this has always been the tradition of a certain kind of pragmatic philosophy, for example that of Spinoza or Nietzsche (that is, to say the very same philosophers of transformation that interested Deleuze) (1995: 28–30). In fact, Foucault also mentions Marxism and psychoanalysis here. The point being that it is not enough just to read about a different state of being, one must become involved in practices that actually allow this different state to emerge. Philosophy in this sense, and at its best, can be a praxis, a way of life.

We might say then that the new has to involve practices that somehow transform the very subject who is ‘looking’ for the new, looking to become something different. Such practices will necessarily have a subjective and possibly non-scientific and introspective character (that is, will not necessarily involve ‘knowledge’). In fact, such practices will look very suspect indeed from the point of view of knowledge (science/the human sciences), involving as they do such a mutable subjective position. We might identify here one of the reasons that introspective technologies (such as meditation) are taken less seriously than those apparently more evidence based and, more prosaically, the reason why art practice, especially in its most expanded – deterritorialized – form (performance, installation and the like) is viewed so suspiciously by research funding bodies.

Schizoanalysis

We can look to Guattari’s solo writings for another kind of understanding of the causes of subjectivity as it is and for the possibilities, in fact specific technologies, for its transformation. Schizoanalysis involves a different cartography of and for subjectivity, one not overdetermined by Oedipus (tied as this is to a certain regime of knowledge, and indeed to a certain organization of power). Guattari offers us an update of Foucault’s care of the self not least in his careful consideration of the role of new technologies in the production of contemporary subjectivity. To think back for a moment to what I have already said about Spinoza, we can say that the new for Guattari most definitely involves a recombination of sorts, the production of different encounters in and with the world (this, we might say, was the operating logic, as Guattari saw it, of the clinic at La Borde, that is a realm of heterogeneous encounter). In fact, this will involve different combinations of matter, but also a moving at different speeds (for example, a slowing down in a similar manner to that which we saw with Bergson).
Crucial here is also the opening up to an ‘outside’ however this is thought (otherwise the system is closed). There are always two faces to any given assemblage in this sense (including, we might say, any given subjectivity), one looking inwards, one looking outwards. A principle of cohesiveness and one of escape. An autopoiesis and an allopoiesis.

Guattari calls the relation/interpenetration of these two the ‘diagram’. The diagram, in Guattari’s terminology, articulates the relation between a non-discursive and asignifying virtual (what Guattari calls incorporeal universes/existential territories) and a discursive and signifying actual (enunciative assemblages/actualized discursive components) (1995: 58–59). An ‘individual’ is the relationship between these two. So, in each case, we need to ask: what are an individual subject’s virtual capacities? Or, how much of the virtual is available to any given individual? (In fact, it is not an individual’s virtual, but rather a specific ‘individual’ is a part of the virtual that has been actualized). This outside – or virtual – is again the ‘new’ element that changes the system or subject.

Elsewhere Guattari writes well on how this is a specifically aesthetic process. Looking to the writings of Mikhail Bakhtin he alerts us to the importance of a rupture or glitch, a break in a dominant regime that itself holds the possibility of something new (the germ of a different world) (1996: 198–99). Something happens – a molecular event, a point of indeterminacy – that knocks us off course and on to another vector, producing a mutant line of desire. In passing it is worth remarking that a certain kind of disinterested subject is required for this operation to work, and further that the rupture itself needs to be followed by new refrains, new habits.

Digression: capitalism

At this point I want to bring up a problem, or a further question, that might equally be asked in relation to Foucault, and indeed to Bergson and to Spinoza. Namely, are these practices that Guattari and Foucault map out, practices that involve contact with – and the utilization of – a certain virtuality or ‘outside’ to typical experience irreducible to capitalism? Or does capitalism in fact also always involve a line to an outside like this? Certainly capitalism’s modus operandi is the colonization of new outsides (new sites of production, new markets). As such it would seem logical that this virtual potential if it is in anyway accessible would be harnessed, and indeed it would seem to me that the chemical and biological industries for instance, as well as the mass media and military-politico establishment, do indeed plug into this virtuality (with the patenting of genetic material and the strategic use of pre-emptive political/military strategy we seem to be witnessing a colonization of the virtual of sorts, an ‘ontological turn’ of capitalism). At this point then I want to qualify my remarks above on Bergson as it does not seem clear that contact with the virtual in and of itself produces
freedom from the present plane of existence or from the numerous controls and classifications on and of the latter. Certainly when we get to this ‘outside’ we might well find Capital has always already arrived there ahead of us (or, at least, ‘appears’ to have always already been there).

To a certain extent Guattari’s collaborations with Deleuze go some way to addressing these problems and paradoxes in that they move away from the topological models I have looked at so far and develop a different approach to the problem. Capitalism, in its advanced stage, produces a variety of types of subjects. Indeed, capitalism operates through deterritorialization and decoding, hence producing schizophrenics, but also potential revolutionaries (as well as, of course, other (Oedipalized) subjectivities). Which is to say, for Deleuze and Guattari, today, there is not really a production of subjectivity that operates ‘outside’ capitalism (although there might be the production of something . . . ). What does this mean in terms of strategy for the production of difference? Well, it might mean not ‘resisting’ capitalism in the usual sense, but rather accelerating it, following some of capitalism’s lines of flight and pushing these breakthroughs further. Working to unblock the blockages, the reterritorializations on the flows. Such is the message of *Anti-Oedipus*: it is never a question of withdrawal from the world market, but of moving in exactly the opposite direction (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 239).

For myself however this is only a kind of answer, in that it is not entirely clear how such a deterritorialized subject might cohere and act in the world (put simply the rupture or breakthrough can produce a general collapse of subjectivity). Hence for Deleuze and Guattari too, I think, the move to the more cautious work of *A Thousand Plateaus* with its emphasis on ‘dosages’ and on the strategic relation between territory and deterritorialization. There is also in this latter work a more careful thinking through of what acceleration might actually involve. In fact, as I mentioned briefly above, it is not so much that there is a difference between an acceleration/disintegration of subjectivity within capitalism’s flows and then some kind of withdrawal from these flows, for with both a certain speed is at stake. An absolute speed of intensity rather than extensity that is opposed to the relative movement of the state. It is the careful and pragmatic rethinking of speed, and the constructive nature of *A Thousand Plateaus* – the models it offers us for new and different forms of organization/subjectivation, paradigmatically with the war machine – that, for myself, makes it more useful (at least for the production of art or subjectivity) than *Anti-Oedipus*. In fact, I would argue that an emphasis on cohesiveness, on a consolidated territory, is needed before anything new can either be identified or utilized. This amounts to saying that a rupture or acceleration *on its own* is not enough and that the production of subjectivity is nothing if not a procedural and constructive project.

The question then is not whether capitalism also colonizes the virtual/produces the new – it most certainly does – but rather what types of relationship
might there be with the virtual, with the new and so on. Which are conducive to joy, as Spinoza might have it, and which are to do merely with increasing ignorance, control, sadness and ultimately paralysis? And further, which types of relationship might play a part in a more processual project of construction? Another way of putting this is to ask what kinds of sustained relationships do, or can, different kinds of individual subject have with ‘their’ outside, a question that invariably is one about actual practice.

Art practice and introspection

What then are the specific technologies available to existing subjectivities for accessing an outside? I want to end this essay with a statement of intent: to explore the actual lived-processes that allow for travel into the virtual, that produce the new. And as a beginning I want to offer up two here, each of which are involved in what Foucault might call the ‘care of the self’, especially when the latter is updated by writers such as Guattari with his attention to the potentialities of new technology and to the vicissitudes of late capitalism.

Art practice

Invariably, an exploration of such transformative technologies will involve attention being given to the kind of art (understood in its widest possible sense), which, as I have suggested elsewhere, operates at this cusp between the virtual and the actual. Art can involve the actualization of a specifically different set of virtualities; the production of a different kind of world. This will involve a reaching forth to the future; that is to say, the art produced in this manner will not necessarily be readable or understandable. Such art is not necessarily about ‘knowledge’, or for a subjectivity already in place (as Deleuze often remarks, the people for true art are invariably missing), but to draw a new subjectivity forth. Art has this strange prophetic function: it is made in the present, from the materials at hand, but calls out to something else. This is its future orientation.

We would also need to attend here to the importance of aesthetic processes in general – those constructive ruptures – that are not necessarily held within art but that nevertheless effect a deterritorialization of subjectivity (Guattari’s molecular revolutions/mutant lines of desire, Deleuze and Guattari’s stuttering and stammering minorities, and so forth). It is these affective-events and moments of non-sense that connect us with the virtual, with ‘our’ outside. There are also the different technologies ‘within’ art, for example film. Such technologies, as Deleuze demonstrates in his Cinema books, carry on Bergson’s intuitive method – to think beyond the ‘human’ – outside philosophy. These technologies give access to different space-times beyond our typical configuration.
Also needing serious consideration is the time we spend with art, and indeed the other different temporalities caught up with art in general: the time it took to make, the time of day/the seasons when we encounter it (a whole atmospherics), and so forth. In opening up a plurality of temporalities something happens to our own. We access different durations. In each of these cases it is our active participation with, and not our passive reception of, art that is crucial (again, this participation might well involve a certain stillness). The crucial factor here is the production of something different, but also our encounter and engagement with this difference.

Art then is a recombination of matter – a scenario/situation is set up, conditions put in place – but art is also that which the recombination of elements allows. Ultimately such a recombination, and that which arises from this recombination, can never be totally planned but must always involve a contact with chance, with an outside to conscious control, or simply an outside to typical subjectivity. In a sense, art is the name for this technology of contact with an outside to our ‘selves’ as well as a name for the different kinds of assemblages and constructions that follow from this contact.

**Introspection**

I think that any serious project of the production of subjectivity will also involve attention being given to various introspective techniques, for example, meditation.\(^1\) This is to say that the production of the new does not just involve a new cartography of subjectivity, but also the acting on that cartography. Following Bergson, Spinoza and Guattari above we might say that like art bodies are also on the edge between the virtual and the actual. However, more often than not, our selves are concerned specifically with the actual, or what we might call the world of utility. Hence the importance of Bergson’s gap between stimulus and response, the ‘slowing down’ that in and of itself allows for a creative response to the world. We might note in passing that Deleuze’s other precursor, Nietzsche, likewise called for a practice of idleness in order to foster genuine thought.\(^2\) In both cases this is a kind of super-productivity arising from a specifically non-productive (in capitalist terms) state. Stillness producing a certain ‘speed’, or intensity, of thought. In fact, in order to really maintain a gap between stimulus and response, a certain tension, or alertness, is required. Another name for this is *samadhi* meditation. We might say that meditation involves a sustained and conscious ‘vacuole of non-communication’, the cultivation of awareness of ones reactive self (as a preparation for further enquiry). Indeed, just by being aware of one’s habitual reactions the latter are subtly altered (again, some space – a gap – is opened up). Here meditation, or introspection, becomes a technology of transformation. It allows us to move from a narrow or reactive mode of being to one that is more open and creative. I would argue that ultimately any break in habit, any ‘new’ way of being in the world, must at some level involve
a first moment of this awareness and indeed a moment of non-reaction, ultimately to pleasure or pain (that is, to say, a certain disinterestedness).

Such attention to the self also reveals a certain truth about subjectivity; that the latter consists more or less solely of habit. This insight too involves a certain practice of introspection another name for which is *vipasana*, or insight meditation. Meditation in this second sense is a pragmatic seeing into the ever-changing aggregates that make up ourselves. We might say *vipasana* meditation allows access to that realm from which the ‘I’ is an extraction. In Bergsonian terms it allows us to travel into the virtual (and the brain-body apparatus that actualizes this virtual becomes altered in that very actualization). In Spinozist terms it involves a specifically different kind of knowledge (a knowledge that arises from contact with a certain reality, the ground of our being, which invariably involves a change in understanding in whomsoever intuits it). A genuinely new kind of subject (or non-subject?) must involve some sense, some awareness, of this ground, this Outside. Meditation is then not a withdrawal from ‘reality’ but a confrontation with the latter as it is incarnated in our selves and as it forms the background to our selves. In a sense it takes the battle against a certain form of grasping, the ‘debilitating consumerism’ that Guattari refers to in *Chaosmosis*, right to its core (1995: 122). This is a confrontation with our essential craving, but also a contact with a realm of potentiality that those habits invariably attempt to efface.

What I have said here briefly in relation to art and meditation amounts to suggesting that there is a creativity of practice (of being an active participant in one’s life (and this might include the apparently paradoxical situation of an active stillness (simply, awareness))) and a creativity of mere spectatorship/consumption. The ‘creativity’ of commerce and commodities, of advertising and endless novelty that is just more of the same. In the latter there is no real invitation to participation, and as such no genuine production of difference. Whether this practice be in the studio, or in life in general, such a production of difference will necessarily involve accessing a realm beyond that practice, if only to return once more equipped with new perspectives, new tools. We need only add here that a new subjectivity also requires new habits to follow from any rupture, new refrains that cohere an assemblage together in a different way. The production of the new, in this sense, is something that can only be ‘decided’ upon experientially – and, we might say, experimentally. The test as to whether it is liberating or controlling, whether it produces joy or sadness, is the test of life.

Notes

1 My brief synopsis generally follows Deleuze’s reading (see Deleuze, 1988b).
2 Antonio Negri articulates this Bergson-Spinoza resonance of the eternal/with the past well in his essay on *kairos*: ‘We will then give the name “eternal” to the time
that is “before”. Eternity is the time that comes before. It is indeed the power of accumulated life, of an irreversible and indestructible temporality; it is the common name of the being that is. Every kairos is installed in this eternity’ (2003: 165).

The contribution that Negri might make to my own discussion of the production of the new would require a further essay. Suffice to say, Negri’s kairos is an orientation or intention of sorts – an oblique and restless line drawn away from linear time. In fact, although Negri pitches kairos against the ‘temporal flux’ of an élan vital, the former has, it seems to me, much in common with Bergson’s gap.

5 In what follows I am drawing particularly on Foucault’s lecture series at the College de France (Foucault, 1995).

4 As Guattari remarks in his essay on ‘The Ecosophic Object’ and in relation to his new aesthetic paradigm: ‘A systematic rejection of subjectivity in the name of mythical scientific objectivity continues to reign in the University’ (1995: 133).

5 We can usefully compare this with what Deleuze says about recognition in Difference and Repetition, and about the ‘genuine encounter’ that always upsets the latter, forcing us to thought (see especially p. 139).

6 See for example Badiou, 2001, or for more detail Badiou, 2005. For Badiou a human becomes a subject by acting in accordance with an event that is irreconcilable with the situation in which it occurs. Fidelity to the event then involves a working against ‘oneself’, and specifically against one’s self interest (or habits). The event is not to do with knowledge as such, but with that which is irreducible to, we might even say that which produces a rupture in, knowledge. In passing it is worth noting a key difference between Badiou and the late Foucault (or indeed Spinoza); for the former one cannot prepare for the unexpected event; for the latter, preparation (that is, a programme; technologies of the self) is the very condition of the event.

7 That is not to say that reading, or writing, might not be just such a practice or indeed that a ‘reader’ might not put such writings into practice in unexpected ways. As Guattari remarks in ‘The Ecosopic Object’, and in relation to his own new cartography of subjectivity: ‘Conceptual tools open and close fields of the possible, they catalyse Universes of virtuality. Their pragmatic fallout is often unforeseeable, distant and different. Who knows what will be taken up by others, for other uses, or what bifurcations they will lead to!’ (1995: 126).

8 In the following remarks on Guattari I am drawing on the key essay ‘Schizoanalytic Metamodelisation’ in his major text Chaosmosis (1995: 58–76).

9 The case with Spinoza is perhaps more complex. The question here is whether Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge is irreducible to capitalism’s axiomatics, or, more scarily, whether it is compatible with them. Insofar as the former is to do with a kind of non-conceptual understanding (or awareness) it would seem that it is indeed irreducible to the latter. Certainly the ‘knowledge’ one acquires here cannot be communicated and cannot be commodified. Nevertheless there might be a sense in which capitalism can market a promise of this state (witness the massive ‘self-help’/New Age market). In fact, I would argue that any genuine knowledge – in terms of understanding/demonstrating causes – is invariably opposed to those subjectivating processes of capitalism that work to maintain a certain ignorance (or simply sad affects).
10 In fact, in *Anti-Oedipus* the production of a subject, or a series of subject-states, is a side/after effect of the workings of capitalism, itself understood as a mode of desiring-production. To condense the complex argument of the third section of the first chapter of *Anti-Oedipus*, a 'subject of enjoyment' is produced at different moments as a synthesis, or consummation of sorts (and also a residuum) between the productivity of the desiring-machines (attraction), and the anti-production of the Body without Organs (repulsion). The subject in this sense is always in process, but at any given moment is the result of a retroactive recognition, as Deleuze and Guattari say: ‘So it’s *me*!’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1984: 20). See especially 16–22.

11 For a more thorough thinking through of this production see O’Sullivan, 2006a.


13 I also attend to some of these in O’Sullivan, 2006b.

14 See O’Sullivan, 2006c.

15 In mapping out his own framework for the production of subjectivity Guattari himself dismisses meditation – at least ‘transcendental meditation’ – as simply ‘a withdrawal into oneself’ and thus having no part to play in ‘a genuine virtual ecology’ (1995: 120). I would argue that on the contrary meditation can be precisely a means of accessing a virtual ecology; there is only an apparent withdrawal as it were.


**Bibliography**


