

**From Possible Worlds to Future Folds (Following Deleuze):
Richter's Abstracts, Situationist Cities, and the Baroque in Art**

In this article I want to think through the notion of possible worlds as developed in Gilles Deleuze's book on Proust and, more significantly, his book on Leibniz.ⁱ In particular I want to produce an *encounter* between certain philosophical concepts - such as the monad and the fold - and a specific art practice, in this case the abstract paintings (or "Abstracts") of the German contemporary artist Gerhard Richter.ⁱⁱ The art practice here is meant not as an illustration of the philosophy, rather the article attempts to think a kind of Deleuze-Richter conjunction, to set each alongside the other and in so doing produce a new kind of assemblage between the two. Indeed the article is an experiment in this sense, an exploration of the resonances between two kinds of thought which although logically distinct seem to parallel one another in their creative and affirmative character. Leading on from this conjunction I want to think a little about the "new" - or *expanded* - baroque as Deleuze understood it, and which might be characterised by the city, and especially the *Situationist* city as it was theorised in the writings of Ivan Chtcheglov. We might say that this fictionalised and utopian city is an example of the Deleuze-Leibniz monad being opened out onto an expanded field of inter-connectivity. We might also characterise this new baroque as the introduction of a logic of *participation* into art practice.

1 Different Worlds

Proust to Leibniz

The essence of art for Deleuze's Proust is difference, understood here as the different viewpoint (that is, different from our own) expressed by the work of art. Art allows us access to other worlds, allows us to experience another's world that would otherwise remain closed to us: "only art gives us what we vainly sort from a friend, what we would have vainly expected from a

beloved.”ⁱⁱⁱ It follows, as Proust himself remarks, that “as many original artists as there are, so many worlds will we have at our disposal” (P 42). Further, these viewpoints, ostensibly on the same world, are in fact “as different as the most remote worlds” (P 42). Indeed it is this irreducible *difference* - this distinct viewpoint - that *expresses* the world (and, as such, constitutes art) (P 41). The essence of art is then a kind of country or landscape, a region of being (P 43). Essence in this sense does not name some mysterious, transcendent quality of art, but rather its internal consistency, or what we might call its “world-building” character. Essence is not explained by subjects, but rather itself constitutes distinct artistic subjectivities. As Deleuze remarks: “Essence is not only individual, it *individuates*” (P 43).

For Deleuze’s Leibniz, this individuation is accomplished by the monad and by *relations* between monads, in fact between a kind of hierarchy of monads. Deleuze writes about this in his last major philosophical work, *The Fold*, foregrounding Leibniz’s diagrammatic notion of the *dominata* and the *dominated*, an account of how, in a superabundant fractal universe, the “stuff” which makes up our world and ourselves “sticks” together.^{iv} On this level then we have the baroque conception of matter: a world of material fabric, composed of smaller and smaller parts and of relationships of capture between these parts. We might call this a general *texturology* of the world. However, monads consist of two floors, or two regimes. The world of matter, open to the universe (exteriority), and the world of the soul, closed in on itself and without windows or doors (interiority). The monad, on its lower floor is in and of the world, connected, as a body, to all other bodies (receiving their “imprint” as Henri Bergson might say). On its upper floor however there are no such connections and no such communication. The upper floor of distinct monads are like private apartments, although each involves “variants of the same interior decoration,” variations on the same dark background (F 100). For Leibniz the upper floor is the soul, or what we might call, following Felix Guattari, the *incorporeal* aspect of subjectivity. As Deleuze remarks in an interview:

Leibniz’s most famous proposition is that every soul or subject (monad) is completely closed, windowless and doorless, and contains the whole world in its darkest depths, while also illuminating some little portion of that world, each monad, a different portion. So the world is enfolded in each soul, but differently, because each illuminates only one little aspect of the overall folding.^v

It is in this sense that the monad can be understood as a kind of ego, involving as it does a “sphere of appurtenance,” a *clear* zone, or again in Bergson’s terms, a kind of “zone of perception” (“containing” only that which is “of interest” to that specific monad). Everything outside of this

zone constitutes the *larger* dark background, the obscure, the imperceptible, which itself will constitute the clear zone of other monads. A monad then is *determined* by its clear zone (and by the relation of differences therein). The clear zone of the tick, for example, is smaller than that of man, involving as it does a smaller zone of clarity (perception of light, smell of prey, tactile sense of surface (or where best to burrow)), although each expresses the whole world for its respective being.^{vi}

We can reconfigure this notion of perception as a kind of ownership. That which is “in” my clear zone is *my* world. It is in this sense that Deleuze reads Leibniz as setting forth an ontology of having over being.^{vii} Life becomes a question of ownership, and of its crisis (a crisis in *property* that links Leibniz to capitalism), for parts are constantly leaving, more often than not captured by other monads.^{viii} As Deleuze remarks, this is why “Nietzsche felt himself so close to Leibniz,” for ownership - one’s domination over the dominated - is a question of power and of one’s personal power to dominate what we might call the “swarm” of one’s being (F 110). This notion of ownership might itself be reconfigured as a question of folding: to have is always to fold. We *fold* that which is outside, inside.^{ix}

For Deleuze-Leibniz it is the convergence of the two levels, of “vertical immanent causality” (impression) and of “transitive horizontal causality” (expression), of the world folded in the monad and the world creased in matter, which constitutes beings (F 100). Individual beings, or souls in Leibniz’s terms, are those reasonable monads not content with mere functioning but which are of a sufficient complexity, have a sufficiently large clear zone, to allow reflection on, and an overview of, the world. These monads are then similar to Bergson’s complex centres of indetermination; in both a kind of self-awareness and self-reflexivity is achieved through increasing perceptual apparatus and overall brain-body complexity.^x

These individuals, or “true forms,” “actualise a virtuality or a potential” (F 110). Put simply each monad brings its own world into being. Importantly, and perhaps surprisingly, this is not necessarily a question of the organic versus the inorganic, for true or “genuine forms” are in fact primary forces which “do not only apply to living organisms, but to physical and chemical particles, to molecules, atoms and photons” (F 103). Here there is no difference in kind between the organic and the inorganic, which is to say there is no clear boundary between the two. As we shall see paintings might be understood as individual beings in this sense, as having two levels: of collective or mass phenomena and of individual form (the primary forces) that in some senses

organises - or *folds* - this matter. These two regimes are then folded over/into one another. They resonate together forming a *harmony*. We might say that this harmony or larger fold is like the *style* of beings in the world (the production of specific subjectivities), or indeed the *style* of art works.

Leibniz's monad then parallels Proust's essence; in both communication is not the issue, but is replaced by another operation: *interpretation*.^{xi} But this is not the interpretation of signifying regimes (in the Saussurean and post Saussurean sense), rather it is the *explication* of signs, the unfolding of that which is implicated. Art, we might say, is that which is folded. Art is a possible world folded, by means of the artist's style, in substance. We are forced to unfold these worlds, that is, to *think*, when we encounter the work of art. Thought here is that process which comes after the encounter (thought is the ripples produced by this encounter). We might say then that art is like a "cut;" it shakes us out of our habitual modes of being and puts other conditions into play (this is its aesthetic power). This is the "violent effect" produced by the sign, not thought itself but the "food of thought" (P 23). Of course, and as Proust demonstrates, this forcing of thought, this desire for interpretation, is also produced when we fall in love (in Leibniz's terms, when we encounter another monad). At first we think it is the object of our love that forces us to think (precisely to *interpret*). Then we move from the object to the subject, locating the origin of this force within ourselves. In fact it is both and neither. It is only when we move from our apprenticeship in love towards our encounter with art that we understand the difference, the difference of another's world, which has forced us to thought. Art then offers us a new image of thought (a new *folding*), one in which recognition (and resemblance) is less important than the encounter, and one in which violence replaces "good will" (hence Proust's elevation of love, or rather "falling in love," over friendship).^{xii} In this new image of thought difference, and the embracing of difference, replaces representation and recognition as thought's *modus operandi*. We might say simply that it is this difference that constitutes art's force and power to move us.

2 Richter's Abstracts

Monadic Painting

The invention of the readymade seems to me the invention of reality, in other words the radical discovery that reality in contrast with the view of the world image is the only important thing. Since then painting no longer represents reality but is itself reality (produced by itself). And

sometime or other it will again be a question of denying the value of this reality in order to produce pictures of a better world (as before) (GR 124).

In an interview with the art critic Benjamin Buchloh the painter Gerhard Richter remarks, in riposte to Buchloh's observation that Richter's Abstracts are kind of *staged*, second-order paintings, that in fact they evoke "moods" and indeed have something "anticipatory" about them.^{xiii} They are not merely a "perversion of gestural abstraction," "not ironic," but, for Richter, "express some kind of yearning" for a "better world."^{xiv} Does this make them melancholy? Are they to be positioned in Messianic time, as the frustrated hope, the broken promise of a longed for but endlessly deferred redemption?^{xv} In fact they seem to operate in a much more affirmative space. The paintings seem to *celebrate* and *express* a certain other worldliness. They are, I would argue, creative - or world *creating* - in their very being. This notion of expression is tricky, for the paintings are not expressions of Richter's subjectivity (there is no return here to the artist-centric model of traditional art history). Rather the expression, as we shall see, is specifically *not* "of" Richter's subjectivity.

As abstract paintings then they are certainly not representations of the world as we experience it, but rather they are pictures of other, we might say possible worlds. Indeed this is perhaps their essential nature. Are they then utopian in the sense Theodor Adorno might use the term? That is to say do they offer a kind of *preview* of redemption (of reconciliation), which although a lie (i.e. ideological) is also a lie that contains a truth - that things might be as they are portrayed in the painting? Again, this is certainly one way of taking them, as kind of 'utopian blinks.'" However, I would argue, it is not necessarily the most *productive*, for Richter's Abstracts seem to offer something different, something equally utopian, but from a different perspective. For this utopia is not a promised but deferred possibility (a world which is always beyond our grasp) but is in fact a possibility in the world as it is here and now. In Deleuze-Leibniz's terms we might say that a Richter Abstract is the actualisation of a set of virtualities resulting in the specific *content* of a specific painting (its organisation), and on the other hand, a realisation of a set of possibilities in the actual *matter* of the painting (the paint, canvas, etc.). The Abstracts then might be understood as monads, as instances of Deleuze-Leibniz's two-floored baroque house. Let us look at the mechanics of this complex operation.

As Deleuze remarks other worlds may have an actuality in the monads that express them, an actuality that remains possible, but which has not yet been made forcibly real (a world in which "Adam does not sin or Sextus who does not rape Lucretia") (F 104). We might call this an

actuality that has yet to be realised, precisely a world to come. Hence the problem of realisation is added to the problem of actualisation. We might say then that Richter's paintings are indeed the *actualisation* of certain virtualities, however we need also to consider to what extent they are *realisations*. In fact I think we can posit two levels of realisation and non-realisation with Richter's paintings. On the one hand, as paintings, they are already realised actualisations. They are after all objects in the world (they are objective, concrete reality). On the other hand, again as paintings, they are *pictures* of something/somewhere *else*. They express a world as yet unrealised. *This* is their utopian character.

Importantly the processes of actualisation and realisation differ in character, the former operating through distribution (difference) the latter through resemblance (representation) (F 105). We have here a formula for Richter's practice: the paintings *perform* difference within repetition. Indeed it is this that constitutes Richter's *style* as a painter, precisely the production of difference from "within" painting, and more specifically from within the different series of Richter's practice.

What should I paint, how should I paint. The "what" is the most difficult, as it is the most essential. By comparison, the "how" is simple. Beginning with the "how" is frivolous, but legitimate. To apply the "how," namely the conditions of technique, of the material, as with those of the physical possibilities - in relation to the intention (GR 118).

Painting, for Richter, means paradoxically beginning with the realisation (the "how") rather than with the actualisation (the "what"). In this sense the paintings are, at least philosophically, counter-intuitive. We might note here the reverse strategy as found in pure maths, fractal equations for example which have an actuality but which are not realised in images.^{xvi} Maths here is diametrically opposed to painting, at least as Richter pursues it. Richter then begins with the lower level, the how rather than the what, a strategy of allowing the painting to emerge from an always already constituted background. Again, this technique, that involves a continuous layering and scraping away of paint, constitutes Richter's style – and we might say characterises him as a specifically baroque painter. As Deleuze remarks:

Baroque is abstract art par excellence: on the lower floor, flush with the ground, within reach, the art comprehends the textures of matter ... But abstraction is not a negation of form: it posits form as folded, existing only as a "mental landscape" in the soul or in the mind, in upper altitudes; hence it also includes immaterial folds. Material matter makes up the bottom, but folded forms are styles or manners (F 35).

Ultimately, in a painting that “works” a harmony is produced between the material of the painting and the picture that emerges. It is the discovery of this harmony, or *resonance*, of force operating on matter, that constitutes abstract art. Here “we go from matter to manner, from earth and ground to habitat and salons,” to what we might call the production of territories (F 35). We might move from here to *What is Philosophy?* where style (the production of a harmony in the above sense) is portrayed as the very thing that constitutes art. As Deleuze and Guattari remark, when this “style” is thought in relation to painting it amounts precisely to the “portrayal” - or *capture* - of forces.^{xvii}

The art object, in this case a Richter Abstract, might then be seen to have the character of an event. An event that actualises a set of virtualities and in so doing *expresses* a possible world. An event drawn from the pure reserve of events, the pure virtuality of an ideal pre-existing world (the “silent and shaded part of the event”) (F 106). The Abstracts are, in Deleuze-Leibniz’s terms, *compossibles* that have been “sifted through” the great screen. They are abstractions, we might even say extractions, from a chaotic multiplicity, itself understood as the sum total of all possibilities. Painting then is not painting on to the blank canvas *a la* Greenberg *et al.* Indeed the canvas is never blank, or empty in this sense, but rather is always already “full” of potentialities. Painting then becomes a process of subtraction from Leibniz’s “dark background,” the black dust of the imperceptible. Indeed this is a distinctive feature of Deleuze’s - and Leibniz’s - ontology. An ontology of fullness and plenitude of which “the world” as we “see” it is an abstraction/subtraction. For Deleuze-Leibniz it is differential relations (and their reciprocal determination) that operate as the “filter” for this field of potentialities. Here the perceptible emerges from, and merges with, the imperceptible; clarity emerges from, and merges with, obscurity; just as sense emerges from, and merges with, nonsense. We might compare this complex and superabundant ontology *and* the differentials that organise it, with what Richter says about the motivation behind his early Abstracts:

The pictures are related to the more recent Colour Charts, above all to the ones in preparation, where a few examples of an infinite variety of mixtures and possible arrangements represent the infinite number of never-to-be-realised possibilities, the boundlessness and complete meaninglessness that I consider hopeful, not as a slogan: “everything is nonsense,” not as an ideology ... But from the point of view a picture by Mondrian is not constructivist, but political ... (GR 110).

The Colour Charts, and the Abstracts that follow immediately on from them, express worlds “produced” by simple differential equations (yes/no decisions).^{xviii} Likewise, and in the same

note, Richter remarks that his “jungle” Abstracts are called as such because they operate under similar conditions to organic jungles: “There everything grows as it grows, not planned, not meaningful, not asked for or necessary but because certain conditions, space, nutrition, etc are there by chance, therefore neither good nor bad, nor free, nor intended for a particular end or purpose” (GR 110).

These paintings - we might call them simply *inorganic jungles* - are made up from just three primary colours, which, through combination and recombination, produce “pictures” in the same way in which life produces the forms it does in a kind of purposelessness purposiveness:^{xix}

The “jungle” pictures in the [Venice] biennale use nature’s colours; I took a long time to consider my materials, with which I can manufacture everything, red-blue-yellow (and light-white), pictures that emerge from a process. Three primary colours as a starting point for an endless chain of colour tones ... Pictures that emerge, grow from the making, not creations, not creative in the sense of that mendacious word ... but certainly creaturely (GR 123).

We might say that the paintings are creaturely in the sense that Bergson’s ontology of creative evolution is creaturely: the endless production of new and diverse forms (life’s actualisation). The Abstracts utopian, and indeed *political* aspect then comes from the fact that they express a different world, a different *combination*, from the one we experience/inhabit everyday - although it is conjoined to the world, made out of the same materials if you like, it does not “appear” from “some other place” or promise to take us there.^{xx}

Of course, with Richter’s Abstracts it is not just the combination - or differential relation - of colours but also the *different* sizes of brush and spatula’s used, and the *different* speeds or intensity of the painting. Again, this is part of Richter’s *style* as an artist. In this sense the Abstracts introduce a new element to the colour charts which we might name here as Richter’s particular technique of *blurring* his canvases.

It is productive here to look at the similarities between Richter’s style and that “second” type of oil painting that Deleuze and Guattari write about in *What is Philosophy?* Indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari it is precisely the relationship between the “how” and the “what,” the technical plane (or what we might call the painting’s realisation) and the aesthetic plane of composition (the actualisation) that produces *different* kinds of painting. The history of art, for Deleuze and Guattari, can in fact be configured as an account of this interrelationship, and particularly of an oscillation between two types of the latter:

Take two states of oil painting that can be opposed to each other: in the first case, the picture is prepared with a white chalk background on which the outline is drawn and washed in (sketch), and finally colour, light, and shade are put down. In the other case, the background becomes increasingly thick, opaque, and absorbent, so that it takes on a tinge with the wash and the work becomes impasted on a brown range, “reworkings” [*repentirs*] taking the place of the sketch: the painter paints on colour, then colour alongside colour, increasingly the colours become accents, the architecture being assured by “the contrast of complementaries and the agreement of analogues” (van Gogh); it is through and in colour that the architecture will be found, even if the accents must be given up in order to constitute large colouring units (WP 192).

Deleuze and Guattari go on to remark:

In the first case *sensation is realised in the material* and does not exist outside of this realisation. It could be said that sensation (the compound of sensation) is projected onto the well-prepared technical plane of composition, in such a way that the aesthetic plane of composition covers it up (WP 193).

Here “art enjoys a semblance of transcendence that is expressed not in a thing to be represented but in the paradigmatic character of projection and in the ‘symbolic’ character of perspective” (WP 193). We might note that this kind of painting has the character of those “projections” - specifically theological - from which Deleuze and Guattari differentiate philosophy (WP 88-90). It is painting as representational, as always already “thought out,” predetermined, before it is even begun.

In the second case it is no longer sensation that is realised in the material *but the material that passes into sensation* ... It is at this moment that the figures of art free themselves from an apparent transcendence or paradigmatic model and avow their innocent atheism, their paganism ... One no longer covers over; one raises, accumulates, piles up, goes through, stirs up, folds (WP 194).^{xxi}

We might position Richter’s Abstracts as precisely pagan in this sense, as militant strikes against transcendence. Indeed we might characterise Richter’s paintings as involving the paradoxical notion of an immanent aesthetic, or a kind of ground level, baroque, aesthetic. When this is combined with what has already been said about Richter’s combinations of colours, and the production of difference this allows, it amounts to positioning the paintings as kind of “immanent utopias.” Here is Richter saying something remarkably similar - about his specifically materialist but also utopian impulse - in 1986:

Fundamentally I am a materialist. Spirit, soul, wanting, feeling, sensing, etc. have material causes (mechanical, chemical, electronic, etc.) ... Art is based on these material conditions. It is a particular mode of our daily dealings with appearance, in which we recognise ourselves and everything that surrounds us. Thus, art is the desire in the manufacture of appearances that are comparable with those of reality, because they are more or less similar to them. Thus, art is a possibility of thinking about everything differently, of recognising appearance as fundamentally inadequate; thus it is an instrument, a method of approaching things closed and inaccessible to us (banal future as well as things fundamentally unrecognisable, metaphysical). Because of that, art has an educative and therapeutic, comforting and enlightening, exploratory and speculative function, thus it is not just existential pleasure, but utopia (GR 118).

Richter's paintings may be the production of possible, even utopian worlds, but they are *not* Richter's worlds. It will be remembered that for Deleuze's Proust it is the *characters* of the novels who express different worlds, but if Richter's paintings *have*, or *are* characters in this sense they are not character's "invented" by Richter,^{xxii} or at least only in the sense that "he" "made" them.^{xxiii} For Richter's "intention" has always been, whether it is in the Photopaintings or the Abstracts, to extract himself (himself understood here as the system of beliefs, attitudes - *habits* of being or *clichés* - which make up one's character).^{xxiv} The paintings are not expressions "of" Richter then, or rather they are not *expressive* of Richter. Indeed Richter's technique of painting militates against this, perhaps most obviously in his use of photography (often found images) in the Photopaintings.^{xxv} In the Abstracts this erasure of the self involves the continuous painting over - and scraping back - of an already laid out pictorial organisation. A method of obliteration then but also, in the new "picture" that emerges, of revelation. This involves the productive utilisation of chance, albeit within boundaries (the rectangle of the painting, Richter's skill with the brush and spatula, and so on). We might call this, following Deleuze's book on Bacon, the painting of the *diagram* over the top of a planned and already painted structure/surface:^{xxvi}

(Everything that one can think out for oneself in this way, all this idiocy, these foolish things, cheap constructions and speculations, amazing inventions, harsh, surprising juxtapositions, which one is of course also forced to see a million times a day in and day out, this mentally deficient misery, the whole stupidly bold botch) - All this I paint away, clear out of my head when I start a picture, that is my ground, which I deal with in the first few layers, which I destroy layer by layer, until all the frivolous rubbish is destroyed. Thus what I ultimately have is a work of destruction. It goes without saying that I cannot do without these detours, thus that I cannot begin with the final state (GR 121).

We might say then that Richter's paintings involve at one and the same time an actualisation of certain virtualities (and consequently, as paintings, the realisation of possible worlds) *and*, at the same time a *deactualisation* of a certain reality, in this case Richter's subjectivity (or at least

certain aspects of it). The same operation happens, ideally, when we encounter a Richter Abstract – especially if we can approach the latter away from our typical “habits of seeing,” or, which is to say the same thing, away from the clichés of art (and indeed of consumer culture in general).^{xxvii} The paintings then produce/perform a different combination, a different *extraction*, from all the possibilities (a different dice throw as perhaps Deleuze would say). It is this that makes them endlessly affirming of life and not just acts of negation.

3 The New Baroque

From Monads to Nomads

Richter’s Abstracts are an example of what Deleuze sees as characteristic of *modern* painting: the “*all-over* fold” (F 123). As such they show us a different kind of folding to those found elsewhere, a different way of folding in and of the world. Richter’s paintings, as possible worlds, are then *not* the monads of a typical and habitual subjectivity (i.e. his or ours) but something more non-human - a form of non-organic life. The paintings can also be understood as atypical forms of thought in this sense, or, as atypical forms that *produce* atypical thought. Another way of saying this is that the paintings operate as kind of “future-orientated” monads that call their audience, understood here as new kinds of subjectivity, into being (we might ask ourselves what kinds of subjectivity Richter’s art invokes? Who are its intended audience? Who are its “missing people”?)

But this is not the end of the story. For Richter’s Abstracts remain paintings and as such do not express the limit of the baroque within art. For as Deleuze remarks a further characteristic of the baroque is a certain “over spilling,” a blurring or smearing of boundaries. As such painting becomes baroque when it “exceeds its frame,” bleeds into sculpture, which itself bleeds into architecture and city planning (F 123). The baroque then names that which is “between” the different arts, which allows, or forces, their deterritorialisation:

Perhaps we rediscover in modern abstract art a similar taste or a setting “between” two arts, between painting and sculpture, between sculpture and architecture, that seeks to attain a unity of arts as “performance,” and to draw the spectator into this very performance (*minimal* art is appropriately named following a law of extremum). Folding and unfolding, wrapping and unwrapping are the constants of this operation, as much now as in the period of the Baroque. This

theatre of the arts is a living machine of the “new system” as Leibniz describes it, an infinite machine of which every part is a machine ... (F 123-4).

This is not however a system, or universe, without a kind of centre. For the baroque names not just the “broadest unity of extension” but also the “highest inner unity” (F 124). If the lower floor is a rippling multiplicity - the world, the *city* - this is still from the point of view of the upper floor. The baroque is then like a cone, its base the seething world of yet-to-be actualised virtualities, but only from the *point of view* of its summit which surveys this terrain, and indeed actualises the latter. It is in this sense that the baroque is at one and the same time the multiple *and* the One, a constant interplay, or *resonance*, between the two (the two floors of the baroque house). We might say that the baroque world *is* then without centre (that is to say it is *post-structural*) but that it is always “seen” from a certain perspective (for Deleuze this is why the baroque world is allegorical in nature - containing as it does a multiplicity of individual “points of view”) (F 125-26). To return briefly to Richter we might characterise the extractions that the Abstracts perform as amounting to specific points of view on a field of pre-existing virtualities.

This perspective or projected unity, although not altogether disappearing, is however changing. It is no longer the unity of a singular monad but rather the paradoxical unity of a kind of divergent series, or trajectory, which in the arts Deleuze names *performance*. Although this is not a new term in terms of art history, what we have with Deleuze’s use of the latter is a *philosophical* description of the “new” expanded practices of the 1960s; a description of that art which includes its audience, and the wider world, in its being *as* art (which is incomplete without this *participation*).^{xxviii} Something is happening here to the notion of the monad, almost as if part of its upper chamber is being ripped - or prized - open on to other monads, other worlds. Indeed Deleuze refers to the road trip of Tony Smith, the “sealed car speeding down the dark highway” as a new kind of model, involving as it does new kinds of technology *and* new relations of speed.^{xxix} These new worlds are the expression of a different kind of harmony - a “new” harmony - between the two floors of the baroque house. We might note here Michael Fried’s refusal, or inability, to engage with this new form of practice, which he names as not art but *theatre*. Deleuze also footnotes Gysin and Burroughs as exponents of this new kind of folding - or “fold-in” - with their practice of cut-ups (precisely the production of an open text) (F 164, n37). We are moving from the autonomy of the baroque house (and of the art object) towards something more open, something more complex: art as expanded and process based. The baroque house has been opened out, at least in part, and this will have a profound effect on the kinds of subjectivities that these new kinds of monads express.

Chtcheglov's City

We might characterise this change as the opening out of the baroque house onto the baroque city. Here “the painter has become an urban designer” (F 137). We might move here from the utopian paintings of Richter to the earlier utopian urban “plans” of the Situationists: the “city models” of Constant, or the larger city paintings of Asger Jorn (both of whom specifically made the move from easel painting to urban planning). Even more pertinent are the writings of that early psychogeographer Ivan Chtcheglov. In fact Deleuze’s formulation of this “new baroque” reads like a parallel manifesto to the “new” psychogeographical practices called for by Chtcheglov. Here is Deleuze:

This extensive unity of the arts forms a universal theatre that includes air and earth, and even fire and water. In it sculptures play the role of real characters, and the city a decor in which spectators are themselves painted images or figurines. The sum of the arts becomes the Socius, the public social space inhabited by baroque dancers (F 123).

Compare this to Chtcheglov’s manifesto for a “new urbanism,” in which the city becomes a site for, and the very means of, expressing one’s subjectivity:

Architecture is the simplest means of *articulating* time and space, of *modulating* reality, of engendering dreams. It is a matter not only of plastic articulation and modulation expressing an ephemeral beauty, but of a modulation producing influences in accordance with the eternal spectrum of human desires and the progress in realising them. The architecture of tomorrow will be a means of modifying present conceptions of time and space. It will be a means of *knowledge* and a *means of action*. The architectural complex will be modifiable. Its aspect will change totally or partially in accordance with the will of its inhabitants ...^{xxx}

Cities, for both Deleuze and Chtcheglov are stages for experimentation and *play*, for the actualisation of different virtualities and the realisation of different possibilities. And for both writers, these cities are yet to be made, or rather, the people for them are yet to arrive (Deleuze shares with the Situationists this utopian or prophetic orientation). Formulated in this way, the city, or what we might call the expanded field of architecture, is a field of folding; a folding that takes place in matter but also in the soul (the desires) of those who produce and are produced by their surroundings. As Deleuze remarks elsewhere:

Architecture has always been a political activity, and any new architecture depends on revolutionary forces, you can find architecture saying “We need a people,” even though the

architect isn't himself revolutionary ... A people is always a new wave, a new fold in the social fabric; any creative work is a new way of folding adapted to new materials.^{xxxii}

The city as a new kind of fold and as a platform for new kinds of folding then. In many ways this is a description of modernity, but it also takes us beyond the modern conception of the city. Indeed, Baudelaire's *flâneur* might be seen as an exemplar of the isolated yet connected two-floored monad (at once *a part of* and *apart from* the crowd/the world). The new *flâneur* of the new baroque has perhaps lost that detachment which characterised Baudelaire, Poe *et al.* The new *flâneur* thoroughly participates in - is *immanent* to - the city. We might even say is an *expression* of the city. Again, this new city (and new city inhabitant) is future orientated. Chtcheglov's city is utopian, but it is a utopia firmly attached to the present, specifically in its utilisation of the already existing city albeit in a *new* way: precisely the practice of the *continuous derive*:

This new vision of time and space, which will be the theoretical basis of future constructions, is still imprecise and will remain so until experimentation and patterns of behaviour have taken place in cities specifically established for this purpose ... buildings charged with evocative power, symbolic edifices representing desires, forces, events past, present and to come ... Everyone will live in his own personal "cathedral" so to speak. There will be rooms more conducive to dreams than any drug, and houses where one cannot help but love. Others will be irresistibly alluring to travellers ... The principal activity of the inhabitants will be the *Continuous Derive*. The changing of landscapes from one hour to the next will result in complete disorientation ...^{xxxiii}

In passing it is worth noting that for Guy Debord, the *derive* is not just an architectural deterritorialisation but also a way of modifying actual human relations, precisely an "opening up" of that which is closed, a breaking out of alienation:

A rough experimentation toward a new mode of behaviour has already been made with what we have termed the *derive*, which is the practice of a passionate journey out of the ordinary through rapid changes of ambiances, as well as means of study of psychogeography and Situationist psychology. But the application of this will to playful creation must be extended to all known forms of human relationships, so as to influence, for example, the historical evolution of sentiments like friendship and love.^{xxxiiii}

Leibniz's house has here been multiplied and opened up in a new form of urbanism which in fact Chtcheglov names, in an echo of Leibniz himself, its specifically *baroque* stage.^{xxxv}

Future Folds

So, the old fold, in art as in the city, has been overtaken by new and different kinds of folds. Folds that have less to do with the isolated monad and more to do with open monads *and* with the relationships between monads. How has this “New Harmony” come about? Deleuze reminds us that Leibniz’s monads “submit to two conditions, one of closure and the other of selection” (F 137):

On the one hand, they [monads] include an entire world that does not exist outside of them; on the other, this world takes for granted a first selection of convergence, since it is distinguished from other possible but divergent worlds, excluded by the monad in question (F 137).

Furthermore “it carries with it a second selection of consonance, because each monad in question will fashion itself a clear zone of expression in the world that it includes” (those parts excluded precisely forming the clear zone of other monads) (F 137). This second selection - a selection made on the basis of a certain harmony, the production of a certain unity - is the operation that is under alteration. The old kind of harmony (the old kind of folding) is losing its privileged position: “dissonances” are “excused from being ‘resolved’, and consequently divergences can be affirmed” (F 137).^{xxxv} This in turn works back on the first condition: the isolated, autonomous monad bleeds over into its fellow monads.

In this strange world - in fact *our* world - differences between outside and inside, between public and private, are increasingly irrelevant, and instead are replaced by relations of variation and trajectory. This world - or *chaosmos* - is made up of “divergent series,” of pure difference, and, as such, “the monad is now unable to contain the entire world as if in a closed circle” (F 137). “It now opens up on a trajectory ... a vertical harmonic [the summit of the cone or point of view] can no longer be distinguished from a horizontal harmonic,” the line between the private condition of a dominant monad and the public condition of monads in a crowd becomes blurred - or rather “fuse” - in a system of interpenetration and transitory moments of capture (F 137). Deleuze footnotes the “planar sculptures” of Carl Andre that precisely no longer contain a volume (express a singular world) but embrace a limitless space in all directions (F 160, n4). Again, we might add that such sculptures precisely require *participation*, an opening up along the horizontal plane, in order that they are activated.

So, monads - or *nomads* - now express a different point of view on a different ground (or cityscape). As I suggested above this is the new kind of foldings that emerge in the 1960s, not only in the expanded performative art practices or the psychogeography of the Situationists, but

also simply in the wider experiments and explorations in drug use/sexuality/communal living, etc. (the opening-up of the “closed house”). This is the actualisation - and activation - of the plane of immanence discussed by Hardt and Negri in *Empire*.^{xxxvi} Indeed, at this point history, itself as a kind of background - as a kind of “scene” of the event of art - can be brought back in. The geopolitical conditions (economic, social - environmental and ecological) which, although not “of” the event provide its ground. In this light we might see the development of new technologies as playing a part in the emergence of this new fold: as we have seen the speeding car of Tony Smith for example, or, we might add, cinema, which as Deleuze demonstrates in the Cinema books offers up a new image of thought, precisely a reconfiguration of space and time (a new folding) and an opening up the closed monad of our subjectivities to other non human worlds (a specifically camera-machine consciousness). The same could be said of the incorporeal universes opened up by even newer visualising and communications technology, VR and the www, the latter being an almost literal instance of the new baroque (and involving the concomitant production of a nomadic subjectivity). Parallel to this is the ongoing production of robotic monads whose foldings are even further removed - and stranger - than our own (moving as they do to different spatial and temporal rhythms). In fact we are already part of this new folding inasmuch as these new prosthetic technologies involve the folding of silicon assemblages “into” our own carbon ones. We might add here the experiments in tissue engineering and molecular biology in general, all sorts of genetic foldings producing all sorts of strange beings, and the even stranger worlds they express. It is in all these new formations that, as Deleuze remarks, monadology is overtaken by nomadology, understood here as precisely the production of new and different kinds of folding, in new and different kinds of worlds.^{xxxvii}

Postscript: The Superfold

In the final couple of pages of his book on Foucault Deleuze likewise considers these new - or future - kinds of folds. This “superfold” as Deleuze calls it will be the result of three folds. First, what we might call the fold of molecular biology, the discovery of the genetic code and the fold of silicon with carbon. Second, the emergence of “third generation machines,” cybernetics and information technology. And third, the folding of language – or the uncovering of a “strange language within language” - an “atypical form of expression that marks the end of language as such.”^{xxxviii} As with the other two this is a fold that opens man out to that which is non-human, which puts him in contact with forces that can then be folded “into himself.” For Deleuze (as for

Foucault) this superfold is synonymous with the superman - or with that which “frees life” from within man:

The superman, in accordance with Rimbaud’s formula, is the man who is even in charge of the animals (a code that can capture fragments from other codes, as in the new schemata of lateral or retrograde). It is a man in charge of the very rocks, or inorganic matter (the domain of silicon). It is a man in charge of the being of language (that formless, “mute, unsignifying region where language can find its freedom” even from whatever it has to say) (F 132).

The first of these folds is the remit of science (although there might be art *about* this fold).^{xxxix} The second although also the concern of science bleeds into art (a contemporary example might be the performance artist Stelarc).^{xi} It is the third however that is properly the terrain of art, the latter understood here as a kind of becoming *minor*.^{xii} Art stammers and stutters the materials available to it - and in doing so produces new ways of folding the world “into” the self, or, more simply, new kinds of subjectivity. We can return here to Richter’s Abstracts, and indeed to the more creative experiments of the Situationists; both involve this manipulation of matter, the production of these new kinds of fold.

Of course there may be other folds still. The Oriental fold for example, which, as Deleuze remarks, is perhaps not a fold at all and consequently not a process of subjectivation (F 36). As Deleuze suggests in relation to this “it may be that the Baroque will have to confront the Orient profoundly” (F 36). It might be argued that the relation of art to this non-fold is one of *ritual*. Which is to say not the production of possible worlds (fabulation), and not the production of subjectivity, or rather both of these but only insofar as they allow access to something - the void, the “ground” - from which these worlds, these subjects had emerged. An *unfolding* then as that which always accompanies the fold, producing new folds but also opening us out to that which is yet to be folded.

ⁱ I would like to thank the two anonymous readers at the *JSBP* for their comments and useful editing suggestions, and Dr. Ullrich Haase for his helpful editorial support. The present article is part of a larger book project, entitled *Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation* (Palgrave, forthcoming), which involves bringing the writings of Deleuze - and Guattari - into contact with specific practices of modern and contemporary art. See also my article “From Geophilosophy to Geoaesthetics: The Virtual and The Plane of Immanence vs. Mirror Travel and The *Spiral Jetty*,” *Pli: Warwick Journal of Philosophy*, 16, May 2005.

ⁱⁱ And more specifically the Abstracts that Richter painted in the 1980s. For a selection of these paintings see the exhibition catalogue *Gerhard Richter*, London: Tate Gallery, 1991. (In the following referenced as GR in the text).

ⁱⁱⁱ Deleuze, G, *Proust and Signs*, trans. Richard Howard, London: Athlone, 2000, p. 42. (In the following referenced as P in the text).

^{iv} Deleuze, G, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1993, p. 110-11. (In the following referenced as F in the text).

^v Deleuze, G, *Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 157.

^{vi} For a discussion of the tick's world in relation to this ethology (and to Von Uexkull) see Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi, London: Athlone, 1988, p. 257.

^{vii} Deleuze quotes Leibniz: "our body is a type of world full of an infinity of creatures that are also worthy of life" (F 109). Our bodies contain other monads - the monads of our organs - that contain still other monads, *ad infinitum*. It is the *viniculum*, a kind of sticky screen, which holds, or coheres, this stuff together. Deleuze also remarks on that third type of monad not "caught" within the relations of dominated and dominata. These are inorganic bodies, which are folded within matter much like felt (F 115). Deleuze also characterises these as "defective" monads that "await on the outside," but they can also be understood as tendencies, containing as they do their own "inner law" or "force" (F 16-17).

^{viii} As Deleuze remarks: "If the baroque has been associated with capitalism, it is because the Baroque is linked to a crisis in property, a crisis that appears at once with the growth of new machines in the social field and the discovery of new living beings in the organism" (F 110).

^{ix} For Deleuze's most thorough account of this folding of subjectivity see his book on *Foucault*, trans. Sean Hand. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988, and especially pp. 94-103. Deleuze reads Foucault's later works as specifically attending to the fold of modern subjectivity (which had begun with the Greeks). We are given an illustration of this with the notion of the ship understood as nothing more than a folding of/in the sea (the inside as constituted by the folding of the outside).

^x For Bergson's major statement on this see chapter three "Of the Survival of Images" of *Matter and Memory*, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer, New York: Zone, 1988, and especially pp. 28-32.

^{xi} Monads, on the upper floor, are entirely enclosed and non-communicating. However it might be said that on the lower floor they are always and everywhere in a kind of communication, the latter understood as the interpenetration and interconnection of all things in the world.

^{xii} To quote Deleuze, writing on Proust: "friendship never establishes anything but false communication, based on misunderstandings, and frames only false windows. This is why love, more lucid, makes it a principle to renounce all communication" (P 42).

^{xiii} Richter, G, "from 'Interview with Benjamin Buchloh,'" *Art in Theory*, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992, pp. 1036-47, quote p. 1042.

^{xiv} Richter, "Interview with Benjamin Buchloh," p. 1042.

^{xv} Stefan Germer for example gives an account of Richter's Abstracts as caught in a kind of deferred longing ("Retrospective Ahead," GR, pp. 22-32):

"Richter's paintings can be understood as a form of communication which is cancelled in the very act, even though the painter's desire to communicate with his viewers via the painting persists. The melancholy character of such a production stems from a simultaneous awareness of the necessity of utopia - Richter has called painting 'the highest form of hope' - and recognition of its inaccessibility" (ibid., p. 31).

Other commentators have also positioned Richter's sensibility in this melancholy double bind, as a "product of an endlessly idealistic, endlessly disillusioned Germany" (Ascherson, N, "Revolution and Restoration: Conflicts in the Making of Modern Germany", GR, pp. 33-39, quote p. 38). To a certain extent my own Richter-Deleuze conjunction is an attempt to rescue the

paintings from this melancholy science (and this might well involve reading them *contra* Richter himself).

^{xvi} Of course with newer, and faster, technologies these worlds are increasingly being realised. The fractal worlds of the Mandelbrot set would be a case in point.

^{xvii} Deleuze, G and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson, London: Verso, 1994, p. 181. (In the following referenced as WP in the text).

^{xviii} And in fact all the subsequent Abstracts require a yes/no decision in terms of deciding when they are “finished.”

^{xix} In the sense that every form of life is made up from a different combinations of the same four elements (i.e. DNA).

^{xx} And it is also the case that any one Abstract might express more than one world. As Sean Rainbird remarks:

“[Richter’s] book *128 Details from a Picture*, made in 1978, provides further evidence of [Richter’s] examining the efficacy and potential of painting as a vehicle of reality. A single abstract painting was photographed by the artist 128 times from different angles, suggesting in didactic fashion the infinite perceptual possibilities - and myriad realities - arising from each abstract painting that contains not a mimetic representation of reality, but rather an equivalent and equally convincing pictorial reality” (“Variations on a Theme: The Paintings of Gerhard Richter.” GR, pp. 11-21, quote p. 13).

^{xxi} Modern art is that which specifically tends towards this second type of painting (Deleuze and Guattari mention Seurat, Mondrian, and Dubuffet) (WP 194). It is in this sense that Richter might be understood as a specifically *modern* painter. As Deleuze and Guattari remark literature and music also oscillate between their own two poles - which is to say their history is also a history of the relationship between the technical and aesthetic planes of composition (WP 195).

^{xxii} The paintings might however be thought of as kind of “rhythmic characters” as Deleuze calls them in his book on *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, trans. Daniel W. Smith. London: Continuum 2003. (In the following referenced as FB in the text):

“Rhythm would cease to be attached to and dependent on a Figure: *it is rhythm itself that would become the figure, that would constitute the Figure*. This is exactly what Oliver Messiaen said about music when he distinguished between active rhythm, passive rhythm, and attendant rhythm, and demonstrated that they no longer referred to characters that have rhythm, but themselves constitute rhythmic characters” (FB 71-72).

^{xxiii} As Richter remarks:

“Accept that I can plan nothing. Any consideration that I make about the “construction” of a picture is false and if the execution is successful then it is only because I partially destroy it or because it works anyway, because it is not disturbing and looks as though it is not planned. Accepting this is often intolerable and also impossible, because as a thinking, planning human being it humiliates me to find that I am powerless to that extent, making me doubt my competence and any constructive ability. The only consolation is that I can tell myself that despite all this I *made* the pictures even when they take the law into their own hands, do what they like with me although I don’t want them to, and simply come into being somehow” (GR 123).

Richter is addressing the complex relation between intention and non-intention here. We might productively compare this with Deleuze-Leibniz’s difficult notion of causality. For the latter causality is a fiction inasmuch as the two floors - of matter and of the soul - are distinct. However “ideal causes” do operate as when we attribute something occurring within the soul (e.g. pain) a physical cause, or something happening “in the world” (e.g. voluntary movement) a immaterial cause. It is this “ideal cause” that operates as the fold between the two regimes, or two floors of the Baroque house. Thus, the “consolation” for Richter that he *made* the paintings, even though he did not *intend* or necessarily control their particular manufacture.

^{xxiv} The same is true for Deleuze's Bacon who explicitly paints against cliché understood as figuration and narrative (and specifically as incarnated in the photograph) (FB 87-92).

^{xxv} The found photograph works to evacuate Richter's subjectivity. At the same time Richter *requires* the photograph as a kind of ground or starting point from which to make the painting. Hence the importance of Richter's archive of images (as seen in the exhibition/catalogue *Gerhard Richter: Atlas*, London: Whitechapel, 2003).

^{xxvi} "The diagram is ... the operative set of asignifying and nonrepresentative lines and zones, line-strokes and colour-patches" (FB 101). In Bacon's painting, the diagram involves the making of random marks that allow the figural - a new kind of "world" - to emerge from the figure. The diagram is then rhythm emerging from chaos, the manipulation of chance to suggest the "emergence of another world" (FB 100).

^{xxvii} It is in this sense that Kant's aesthetic, and especially the notion of a "disinterested" response to art, continues to be important in thinking about the rupturing and transformative force of contemporary art.

^{xxviii} For example the "Happening" as outlined by Allan Kaprow in his 1960 essay "Assemblages, Environments and Happenings," reprinted in *Art in Theory*, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, Oxford: Blackwell, 1991, pp. 703-9. For Kaprow this new kind of art involves breaking with those "conditions set down by the structure of the house," and the concomitant development of an expanded notion of art (ibid., p. 703). Kaprow gives a series of rubrics for this kind of art, all of which are relevant to Deleuze's definition of performance. They are:

"A *The line between art and life should be kept as fluid, and perhaps indistinct, as possible...B Therefore, the source of themes, materials, actions, and the relationships between them are to be derived from any place or period except from the arts, their derivatives, and their milieu...C The performance of a Happening should take place over several widely spaced, sometimes moving and changing locales...D Time, which follows closely on space considerations, should be variable and discontinuous...E Happenings should be performed once only...F It follows that audiences should be eliminated entirely*" (ibid., p. 706-08).

^{xxix} In interview Deleuze develops this line of argument further:

"The minimalist art of Tony Smith presents us with the following situation: a car speeding along a dark motorway lit only by the car's headlamps, with the tarmac hurtling by in the windscreen. It's a modern version of the monad, with the windscreen playing the part of a small illuminated area ... The move towards replacing the system of a window and a world outside with one of a computer screen in a closed room is something that's taking place in our social life: we read the world more than we see it" (*Negotiations*, pp. 157-8).

^{xxx} Chtcheglov, I, "Formulary for a New Urbanism (1953)," *An Endless Adventure...An Endless Passion...An Endless Banquet: A Situationist Scrapbook*, ed. Iwona Blazwick, London: Verso, 1989, pp. 24-25, quote p. 24.

^{xxxi} Deleuze, *Negotiations*, p. 158.

^{xxxii} Chtcheglov, "Formulary for a Unitary Urbanism," p. 25.

^{xxxiii} Debord, G, "Towards a Situationist International," *An Endless Adventure...An Endless Passion...An Endless Banquet: A Situationist Scrapbook*, ed. Iwona Blazwick, London: Verso, 1989, pp. 26-28, quote p. 27.

^{xxxiv} Chtcheglov, "Formulary for a Unitary Urbanism," p. 25.

^{xxxv} Deleuze makes this argument specifically in relation to music, and to the "move" to a post-war serialism (for example with Boulez). We might say that John Cage operates as the bridge here between an explicitly musical definition of Deleuze's "new harmony" and one that names the expanded field of "performance art," and indeed the avant-garde practices of the 1960s in general.

^{xxxvi} Hardt, M and Antonio Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. See especially pp. 260-64.

^{xxxvii} This is the coming of the “New Barbarians” predicted by Hardt and Negri (*Empire*, pp. 213-18), and perhaps most explicitly mapped out in Donna Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century,” *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 149-65. It is important to note that technological development in itself does not provide for dissonant, radical - or emancipatory subjectivities. Indeed one need only track the military development of cyborg and AI technologies (see for example Manuel Delanda’s *War in the Age of Intelligent Machines*, New York: Zone, 1991). In the terms of this article we might say that attention needs to be turned to what kind of monads - or subjectivities (fascist? communist? *revolutionary?*) - produce, and are produced by, these technologies. This is the important business of Felix Guattari’s solo work on the production of subjectivity (see his *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-aesthetic Paradigm*, trans. Paul Bains and Julian Pefanis, Sydney: Power Publications, 1992, and in particular chapter one “On the Production of Subjectivity,” pp. 1-32).

^{xxxviii} Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 131.

^{xxxix} The best example of contemporary times being the practice of Jake and Dinos Chapman. See for example the work in *Hell*, London: Jonathan Cape/Saatchi Gallery, 2003.

^{xl} Stelarc’s performances of the 1970s might be seen as an exploration of the bodies limits (i.e. pain) - experiments to discover what a body is capable of. As such, they can be read through the optic of Spinoza as precisely ethological/ethical experiments. With his more recent work - with communication technologies and robotic prosthesis - we might see a more explicitly Leibnizian theorisation of the body (relationships between the dominata and dominated) and of how the body moves from being an autonomous closed monad to something more open (a move, according to Stelarc, which amounts to switching from a psychoanalytic account of subjectivity to a cybernetic one) (“Parasite Visions,” *Art and Design*. 56, 1997, pp. 66-69):

“Imagine the consequences and advantages of being a split body with voltage-in, inducing the behaviour of a remote agent and voltage-out, for your body to control peripheral devices. This would be a more complex and interesting body - not simply a single entity with one agency but one that would be a host for a multiplicity of remote and alien agents of different physiologies and in varying locations” (ibid., p. 66).

For Stelarc, it is via the www that this expanded body – or exploded monad – is specifically produced.

^{xli} For the most complete discussion of the “minor” see Deleuze and Guattari’s *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*, trans. Dana Polan, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, and especially chapter three, “What is Minor Literature?,” pp. 16-27.